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The Tithes of Apartheid: Perceptions of 
Social Mobility Among Black 





Although almost entirely ignored by South African scholars, studying 
perceptions of social mobility is profoundly important for understanding South 
Africa’s changing economic and political environments. This study probes 
perceptions of social mobility in a single South African city, Cape Town, 
through twelve in-depth ethnographic interviews with black African residents of 
Cape Town. This paper differs from other research on perceptions of social 
mobility by examining how previous experiences of social mobility, instead of 
current class position, influence these perceptions and future expectations.  
Most of the interviewees stressed the continuing relationship between race and 
class: respondents tended to believe that the top of the income distribution is 
mostly white, while the bottom of the income distribution is entirely black.  
Despite the widespread perception of the distribution of income in South Africa 
as racialised, all of the interviewees identified a number of pathways to upward 
mobility for black people. They disagreed, however, on the accessibility of these 
pathways. This study found that those who had either experienced some degree 
of social mobility or those who were born into advantaged backgrounds tended 
to conceptualise mobility in predominantly individualistic terms and believed 
that upward mobility was available to those willing to work hard and motivated 
to take advantage of educational opportunities. In contrast, those from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds who had not experienced significant mobility, 
although also recognising the importance of hard work and education for 
economic success, tended to offer structural explanations for their lack of 
mobility and faulted their lack of social capital and rampant nepotism in Cape 










Social Mobility in South Africa: an 
Underexplored Field 
 
On the eve of its transition to democracy, South Africa ranked “among the most 
unequal societies in the world” (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 188).  And during 
the first 18 years of its democracy, South Africa’s already unparalleled degree 
of inequality has risen considerably, despite hopes that democratisation and the 
enfranchisement of South Africa’s poor, black majority would work to redress 
the pernicious economic legacies of apartheid (Seekings, 2011a: 22).  South 
Africa’s Gini coefficient—a commonly used measure of income inequality that 
is derived from the Lorenz Curve and ranges from 0 in completely egalitarian 
societies to 1 in societies where a single individual receives all of the income—
was 0.66 at the end of apartheid, 0.68 in 2000, and 0.7 by 2008 (Leibbrandt et al. 
2010: 32).1  Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the Gini index may 
actually underestimate the growth of income inequality in South African society.  
The Gini coefficient is better able to capture changes in the middle of the 
income distribution than at the tails.  Thus, if the rich are getting comparatively 
richer or the poor are getting comparatively poorer, as appears to be happening 
in South Africa (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 26), then the Gini coefficient will 
underestimate the degree of inequality (Seekings, 2011b: 29). 
 
South Africa’s persistently high and growing levels of inequality have 
unsurprisingly led to significant space being dedicated to analysing the nature of 
this inequality and its repercussions for South African society.  Scholars have 
highlighted the changing composition of this inequality.  Towards the end of 
apartheid, South Africa’s distribution of income began to “reflect race far less 
than class” (Seekings, 2008a: 22) because of “the expansion of educational and 
employment opportunities for black South Africans” (Seekings, 2008c: 40).  
While aggregate inequality has risen since South Africa’s democratic transition, 
this growth in inequality is a result of increasing intra-, as opposed to inter- 
racial disparities (see Table 1), a trend that began before the end of apartheid 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 300).  The Theil-T Index for inequality - which 
analyses the percentage of the Gini coefficient that is derived from within-group 
versus between-group inequality - indicates just how profoundly South Africa’s 
distribution of income has been deracialised.  Whereas in 1975 intra-racial 
inequality accounted for 38 percent of total inequality, by 1996 intra-racial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although there is much variation in reported Gini coefficients, these variations are largely 
attributable to the methodology employed and there is general “agreement” about the rising 








inequality represented 67 percent of aggregate inequality, and by 2008 this 
figure had climbed to 70 percent (Whiteford and Van Seventer, 2000: 17; 
Leibbrandt et al., 2012: 30).2 
 
This trend reflects the growing economic power of sections of South Africa’s 
previously marginalised black population and the partial deracialisation of 
South Africa’s class structures.  The proportion of income going to South 
Africa’s white population fell from 71 percent to 48 percent between 1972 and 
2001, while the proportion of income going to Africans rose from 20 percent to 
38 percent (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 304; Leibbrandt et al., 2006: 102).  
Consequently the middle and upper classes in South Africa have become 
increasingly more integrated since the end of apartheid (Seeking and Nattrass, 
2006: 336).  The “middle class,” for example, which was only 29 percent black 
in 1994, was nearly half black by 2000 (Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 66).  Similarly, 
whereas Africans made up only 28 percent of the top two income deciles in 
1995, they constituted over 45 percent of the top two deciles in 2000 (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2006: 306).  Although inequality is still correlated with race 
(Simkins, 2011: 107), as Landman et al. (2003: 7) conclude, “The main driver 
of inequality currently in SA is no longer the Black/White divide, but rather the 
intra-group divide between rich Blacks and poor Blacks.” 
 
Although important, analyses of the changing nature of South African inequality 
and South Africa’s distribution of income are ultimately limited.  As Louw, Van 
der Berg and Yu (2007: 549) emphasise, “Analysing the income distribution at 
any given moment using cross-sectional data generates a static picture only.”  
That is, although these studies offer insights into what is changing in South 
African society, they offer less insight into who is benefiting from these changes 
and why these changes are occurring (Woolard and Klasen, 2005: 866).  And the 
study of these trends in South Africa - the study of social mobility - may 
ultimately provide greater insight into the evolution of post-apartheid South 
Africa than studying inequality alone.  As Birdsall and Graham (2000: 5) note, 
“Mobility provides a better measure of changing opportunities than do the 
traditional measures of inequality, and […] understanding mobility is critical to 
the discussion of inequality and of what to do about it.”  Unfortunately, the 
study of social mobility in South Africa is very “limited and generally more ad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen, in contrast, argue that inter-racial inequality has actually 
been increasing.  However, they offer no explanation for why their “admittedly provisional 
evidence” does not conform to the predominant trends found in the literature (Bhorat and Van 








hoc” (Woolard and Klasen, 2005: 896; see also, Louw, Van der Berg, and Yu, 
2007: 549). 
 
Although the existing literature on social mobility is limited, investigating the 
nature of social mobility in South Africa is enormously important.  Inequality is 
not de facto detrimental.  As Birdsall and Graham (2000: 6-9) argue, inequality 
can be both “constructive” and “destructive.” “Constructive inequality” fosters 
economic growth by encouraging creativity and production.  In contrast, 
“destructive inequality” restrains growth by limiting the opportunities available 
to individuals.  Although it is nearly impossible to disaggregate these two kinds 
of inequality, “a good indirect approach [to discovering the nature of inequality] 
is to analyse access to opportunity by measuring the extent and nature of social 
mobility.”  It is thus impossible to fully understand the nature and impact of 
South Africa’s extremely high levels of inequality without first investigating the 
nature and impact of social mobility in South Africa. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, social mobility has profound repercussions for the 
robustness of South Africa’s nascent democracy.  Scholars have increasingly 
highlighted the negative relationship between income inequality and democratic 
consolidation.  Muller, for example, (1997: 152; see also, Muller, 1988) has 
suggested that “high levels of income inequality are [completely] incompatible 
with the development of a stable democratic political system” (see also, Boix 
and Stokes, 2003; Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Houle, 2009).  
Social mobility, by making high levels of inequality more acceptable to the 
masses, may counteract the deleterious effects of inequality on democracy and 
democratisation (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 245-6; see also, Boix, 2003: 
14, 140).  As Fukuyama (2011: 85) describes, there is a school of thought that 
believes that “single time-point measurements of income inequality such as the 
Gini coefficient are less important than the question of intergenerational social 
mobility” for democratic longevity.  Thus, the degree of social mobility in 
South African society can offer insights into the strength of South Africa’s 
democracy. Further, with little hope of ameliorating South Africa’s high levels 
of inequality in the foreseeable future, the robustness of South Africa’s 
democracy may depend in part on South Africa’s ability to foster equality of 
opportunity and social mobility. 
 
Investigations of social mobility have repercussions that extend beyond the 
study of inequality in South Africa.  South Africa has invested an enormous 
number of resources in ameliorating the racialised legacies of apartheid and 








policies, including affirmative action programs, and has made large investments 
in education, housing, service delivery and infrastructure, in order to redress the 
gross inequality of opportunity inherited from apartheid.3  The study of social 
mobility in South Africa can thus reveal whether these policies are working and 
whom they are benefiting. In the words of Burger, Burger, and Van der Berg 
(2003: 1), it can reveal “to what extent the new system has managed to 
effectively eradicate the remnants of apartheid-era racial discrimination” - and 
can perhaps offer insights into why certain policies have failed to achieve their 
desired goals and the most efficacious ways to redress apartheid’s legacies (see 
Woolard and Klasen, 2005: 866 for a more detailed discussion). 
 
Yet, despite the profound importance of a socially mobile society for the vitality 
of post-apartheid South Africa, “almost no work has been done on mobility in 
South Africa” (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 262).  This paper thus attempts to 
augment the existing literature on social mobility in South Africa by 
investigating perceptions of social mobility in a single South African city, Cape 
Town.  This paper differs from previous explorations of social mobility in South 
Africa by focusing primarily on perceptions - as opposed to statistical trends - 
of social mobility in Cape Town’s African community through twelve in-depth 
ethnographic interviews with individuals from diverse mobility backgrounds.   
 
The paper sets forth a discussion of the existing literature and highlights the 
major shortcomings of the current academic approach to social mobility in 
South Africa.  It then discusses the methodology of this study and offers a brief 
sketch of the study participants.  Finally, the paper discusses its major findings 
and describes the perceptions of social mobility among the twelve interviewees. 
This final section is divided into three parts: firstly, the paper describes how the 
respondents conceptualise the economic stratification of South African society; 
secondly, it critically examines mobility pathways emphasised by the 
respondents during the interviews; and finally, it explores perceptions of both 
intra- and intergenerational mobility among the interviewees.  Although this 
paper does not claim to be a comprehensive sketch of social mobility in South 
Africa, it offers initial findings on perceptions of social mobility in Cape Town 
and suggests a potentially fruitful path for social mobility scholars to pursue. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Breen and Jonsson (2003: 223) defined “inequality of opportunity” as “a person’s chances 








A Review of the Existing Literature: Seeking 
Objective Trends; Ignoring Subjective Facts 
 
There are two dominant approaches to the study of mobility (Morgan, 2006: 4-
5).  The first - known as “social” or “class” mobility and favored by sociologists 
- analyses movement between social classes, often defined in terms of 
occupational categories.  The second - known as “economic” or “income” 
mobility and favored by economists - investigates changes in individual or 
household income over time.  Although sociologists and economists 
conceptualise mobility in different ways, in practice both approaches share more 
similarities than differences.  Income is, of course, closely related to 
occupational class.  And as Morgan (2006: 4) contends, when income mobility 
is “analysed as cross-classifications of quantiles”, as it often the case, both 
“methods are quite similar in spirit” (Morgan, 2006: 5). 
 
Furthermore, although sociologists and economists tend to focus on different 
outcome variables - one on changes in social class, the other on changes in 
income - both analyse mobility through similar paradigms.  Mobility researchers 
from both disciplines distinguish intra-generational mobility, or the changes that 
occur to an individual or household’s “social class or earnings during their own 
working lives” (Pearce, 2011: 4), from intergenerational mobility which is “the 
degree to which an individual’s socio-economic status depends on his or her 
parents’ status” (Girdwood and Leibbrandt, 2009: 1).  Both economists and 
sociologists disaggregate absolute rates of mobility from relative rates.  While 
absolute mobility measures the degree to which an entire society gains or loses 
over time, relative mobility reflects the extent to which individuals gain or lose 
relative to others from different socioeconomic and class positions.  
 
The sociological literature on mobility is, however, considerably more 
developed than the economic literature.  The most important contribution to the 
literature on class mobility is Goldthorpe et al.’s (1980) analysis of mobility in 
Britain (see, Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 263). Goldthorpe et al. concluded that 
although Britain experienced considerable absolute mobility during the decades 
following World War II due to changes in its post-war occupational structure, 
relative rates of mobility remained fairly constant (Goldthorpe et al., 1980: 251-
2).  Goldthorpe et al.’s work, however, was less significant for its findings than 
for its methodological approach: Goldthorpe et al. developed a class schema 
based on occupation and analysed both intra-generational and intergenerational 









Goldthorpe et al.’s methodological framework has since been extended beyond 
Britain.  Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), who analysed occupational mobility in 
twelve industrialised countries, found that although there was variation in 
absolute rates of mobility across the twelve countries, relative rates of mobility, 
as in Goldthorpe et al.’s analysis of class mobility in Britain, were generally 
constant.  Goldthorpe et al.’s and Erikson and Goldthorpe’s findings on absolute 
and relative rates of class mobility, however, do not appear applicable to all 
countries; Breen and Luijkx (2007), for example, found increasing rates of 
relative mobility in Germany, contrary to Erikson and Goldthorpe’s findings in 
other European countries.  Additionally, Costa-Ribeiro and Scalon (2001) found 
a similar trend in Brazil. 
 
Despite the robust international literature on class mobility, little analysis has 
been done on social mobility in South Africa, in no small part because of a lack 
of available data (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 264).  Schneier (1983) observed 
significant upward occupational mobility for Africans in Soweto and three 
townships around Cape Town - Nyanga, Langa and Gugulethu - but concluded 
that mobility among Africans was not equally distributed.  Those in Soweto 
were more mobile than those in the Cape Town townships, and permanent 
residents in all four townships were considerably more mobile than “hostile 
dwellers,” who were primarily contract workers and thus had no legal right to 
permanent residence in urban areas (ibid: 107-9).  Schneier also found that 
Africans from relatively privileged backgrounds were much better prepared to 
take advantage of the increasing opportunities available to black Africans than 
those from less privileged backgrounds (ibid: 45-6).  Schneier’s work, however, 
is ultimately limited: although his analysis indicates that there was an expansion 
of opportunities for black South Africans in the early 1980s, his conclusions 
were based on relatively small samples around just two urban areas. 
 
Crankshaw (1997), using data from the Manpower Surveys beginning in 1965, 
conducted a much more comprehensive analysis of occupational mobility in 
South Africa during apartheid.  Crankshaw, who was primarily concerned with 
documenting the movement of Africans into white class strata, indicated that 
there was significant upward mobility of Africans into primarily white 
occupations towards the end of apartheid, which accounted for the significant 
increase in the average wages of Africans during the same time period.  But the 
basis of Crankshaw’s analysis, the Manpower Surveys, exclude many black-
dominated occupations, including farm employees, domestic workers and the 
self-employed, and fail to collect data on the occupational background of the 








intra- and intergenerational class mobility.  Also, both Schneier’s and 
Crankshaw’s studies focus on occupational mobility during apartheid.  Thus, 
although their work provides important context for the study of class mobility in 
post-apartheid South Africa, it offers little insight into the fundamental changes 
in access to opportunity that was facilitated by the advent of democracy and the 
effect that these changes have had on social mobility. 
 
Ziervogel and Crankshaw (2009) attempt to plug this large gap in the existing 
literature by analysing intergenerational occupational mobility in post-apartheid 
South Africa with data from the 2000 Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey 
(KMPS), a representative survey of adults over the age of 18 in the Mitchell’s 
Plain Magisterial District that included retrospective data on parents’ 
occupational status.  Ziervogel and Crankshaw observed a significant degree of 
downward intergenerational mobility among respondents and concluded that 
class advantage was generally not transmitted from parents to their children 
(Ziervogel and Crankshaw, 2009: 247-8).  However, Ziervogel and 
Crankshaw’s findings are, by their own admission, not generalisable to the rest 
of Cape Town, let alone South Africa; because Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha 
have a disproportionate number of working class (and unemployed) respondents, 
“the sample will therefore tend to highlight downward mobility” and overlook 
the upwardly mobile (ibid: 248). 
 
In contrast to sociologists, economists are generally less interested in issues of 
individual mobility (Stiglitz, 2000: 36).  Furthermore, analysis of income 
dynamics requires panel data, which are generally less available for developing 
countries (Bourguignon, Goh, and Kim, 2006: 349).  Unsurprisingly, the 
literature on income mobility in South Africa is thus quite limited.  The 
literature that does exist, however, can be divided into two categories based on 
the data sets analysed: those that examine trends of social mobility in the Project 
for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) and its follow up 
survey, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey (KIDS); and those that 
utilise the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) for their investigations.  
PLSD surveyed a representative sample of households in KwaZulu-Natal - 
South Africa’s most populated province - and households first surveyed in 1993 
were re-interviewed in 1998 and again in 2004 by KIDS (Agüero et al., 2007: 
789).  NIDS sampled a nationally representative sample of individuals in 2008 
and re-interviewed the same individuals in 2010/2011 in order to track changes 
in income over the two-year period (Finn, Leibbrandt, and Levinsohn, 2012: 1).  
Analysis of panel data generally provides insights into changes in income over 








NIDS sample and of multi-generational data in both PSLSD-KIDS and NIDS, 
however, can reveal longer term and intergenerational mobility trends. 
 
KIDS was designed primarily to uncover trends in poverty in KwaZulu Natal 
and not to investigate income mobility (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 323).  
Most studies analysing PSLSD-KIDS data, thus, seek to trace movement into 
and out of poverty in KZN. Carter and May (2001: 2002) found that there was 
little social mobility among the poor between 1993 and 1998: in the PSLSD-
KIDS sample, up to 38 percent of households were trapped in chronic poverty 
and an additional 35 percent of households were transitorily poor.  In a 
subsequent study of poverty in KwaZulu-Natal, Adato, May and Carter (2006: 
230-1) largely confirmed Carter and May’s findings.  Adato, May and Carter 
concluded that, although there was a “modest pattern of upward structural 
mobility,” there were “relatively large amounts of structural poverty… 
consistent with the hypothesis that social exclusion and ineffective social capital 
are an important legacy of apartheid.”  Although May and Woolard (2007: 22) 
found that poverty in their panel of people in KZN fell between 1998 and the 
third wave of the study in 2004, they ultimately reported little change in chronic 
and transitory poverty over “the eleven year period of the survey.” 
 
Similarly, Agüero et al. (2007: 797, 808) reported that 45 percent of households 
were transitorily poor and 53 percent of poor households were chronically poor 
- that is, 28 percent of households in the sample were poor in all three waves of 
the study.  Although Agüero et al. found that there was some degree of upward 
intergenerational mobility among those interviewed, intergenerational mobility 
in poor households was more limited and there was significant downward intra-
generational mobility among those living near the poverty line.  The usefulness 
of PSLSD-KIDS data in the study of mobility in South Africa, however, is 
ultimately questionable.  Attrition rates among KIDS participants were 
extremely high between each successive wave, introducing potential bias into 
the sample.  As Agüero et al. (ibid: 790) conclude, “the KIDS study is not a 
fully representative sample of the Africans and Indians living in KwaZulu-Natal, 
let alone of South Africa in its entirety.”  Furthermore, PSLSD was not designed 
to be a panel survey, which ultimately circumscribes the usefulness of 
longitudinal analyses of the PSLSD-KIDS data. 
 
Scholars interested in income mobility in South Africa have more recently 
turned their attention to the National Income Dynamics Survey, which was 
developed in large part to better understand these mobility dynamics (Woolard 








analysis of NIDS data is still very much in its infancy, initial results indicate 
that the degree of social mobility in South Africa is relatively low. Finn, 
Leibbrandt and Levinsohn (2012), for example, analysed the first two waves of 
NIDS to gauge intra-generational mobility in South Africa.  Their findings paint 
a mixed picture of the degree of social mobility in South Africa: their analysis 
found significant movement in the middle of the income distribution, but the 
majority (70 percent) of South Africans in the bottom quintile remained in that 
quintile, and over three-quarters of those in the top quintile remained among the 
richest 20 percent of South African families (ibid: 12 and 18).  Although Finn, 
Leibbrandt and Levinsohn did not perform a multivariate analysis in order to 
determine the characteristics that make certain families more mobile than others, 
they highlight the role of household size and employment as the two biggest 
drivers of income mobility (ibid: 21-2). 
 
Analysis of NIDS data, however, suffers from a number of shortcomings.  Not 
only is two years - the amount of time between the two available waves of 
NIDS - an inadequate time frame to fully uncover the nature of social mobility 
in the rapidly changing post-apartheid environment, but as Woolard and 
Leibbrandt (2006: 12) highlight in their prospectus for NIDS, “You generally 
need 3 waves of a panel to start to … tease out mobility pathways.”  Only two 
waves of NIDS have been conducted.  With time and the continuation of NIDS, 
we should expect these issues to no longer impact future analyses of NIDS data 
and for NIDS to play an increasingly important role in the understanding of 
income mobility in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Despite the dearth of data on occupational and income dynamics in South 
Africa, the degree of intergenerational class and income mobility can be 
measured indirectly through educational mobility, about which there is 
significantly more data (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 330).  Because 
educational level is highly correlated with both occupational attainment and 
average wages in South Africa (see Birdsall and Graham, 2000: 15; Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2006: 330; Keswell and Poswell, 2004), educational mobility can 
potentially provide insights into the nature of South Africa’s social mobility.  
Although Nimubona and Vencatachellum (2003) found little educational 
mobility among poorer families in the KIDS survey, most analyses report a 
significant degree of intergenerational educational mobility in South Africa.  
Louw, Van der Berg and Yu (2007), analysing educational mobility between 
1970 and 2001, found a considerable degree of educational mobility among 
black South Africans, although there were still large racial disparities at the 








the first wave of NIDS in 2008, report significant educational mobility across 
race, age, geotype and gender, with Africans experiencing more educational 
mobility than their white counterparts. 
 
Educational mobility, however, may ultimately be a poor proxy for social 
mobility in post-apartheid South Africa.  Although Girdwood and Leibbrandt 
(2009: 6, 11, 22) reported a considerable degree of educational mobility in their 
analysis of NIDS data, this increased educational attainment did not translate 
into occupational mobility, especially for Africans.  Seekings and Nattrass 
(2006: 332) offer a possible explanation for this observed trend: “It might well 
be the case that people with identical educational qualifications have different 
prospects in the labour market because of the different information, attitudes 
and networks that they inherited or acquired from their contrasting social 
backgrounds.”  Thus, those who have experienced considerable educational 
mobility may be at a relative disadvantage in the labor market because they lack 
the necessary social capital.   
 
Additionally, not all educational backgrounds are similarly perceived by 
employers; two individuals, for example, may have same number of years of 
schooling, but one individual may command a premium in the labor market 
because of the reputations of the institutions that he attended or his area of 
academic focus.  And Keswell and Poswell (2004: 835 and 844) concluded that 
educational achievement has little impact on average wages before the tertiary 
level, indicating that access to tertiary education, not educational mobility per se, 
has a more profound impact on social mobility in South Africa 
 
In an attempt to seek easily measured rates of mobility, the existing literature 
has largely neglected to study perceptions of social mobility in South Africa, an 
area of study that is a common trend globally (Strauss, 2006: 4).  Although there 
is a vibrant debate in the social psychology literature about to what degree 
perceptions reflect and shape reality (see Jussim [1991] for a more detailed 
discussion), it is generally accepted that, in the words of Campbell, Converse 
and Rodgers (1976: 4), “The relationship between objective conditions and 
psychological states is very imperfect and that in order to know the quality of 
life experience it will be necessary to go directly to the individual himself.”  
And perceptions of social mobility appear particularly dissociated from 
objective trends (Graham, 2000: 227; Heath, de Graaf and Li, 2010: 30). 
 
Ultimately, it is subjective perceptions of social mobility, not objective trends, 








Perceptions of social mobility not only have a profound influence on an 
individual’s views of the economic system in which he or she operates, but 
these perceptions also have a significant impact on his or her voting behavior 
(Birdsall and Graham, 2000: 5).  Furthermore, as Graham (2000: 228) argues, 
subjective mobility trends “can [also] have long-term effects on incentives and 
allocation structures.” And for post-apartheid South Africa, examining 
perceptions of social mobility and inequality appears particularly important 
because perceptions of economic inequities and mobility have profound 
repercussions for social and political cohesion (Behrman, 2000: 77; Burns, 
2009: 7).  
 
There has been some work done internationally on perceptions of social 
mobility (see, e.g., Graham, 2000 [Latin America and Peru]; Mateju, 2000 
[Eastern Europe]; Webb, 2000 [Peru]; Heath, de Graaf and Li, 2010 [Britain]).  
Most of the available literature, however, is based on responses to survey 
questionnaires that tend to highlight the dissociation between objective and 
subjective mobility and fail to uncover the potential repercussions of this 
dissonance for society.  Therefore, although surveys are perhaps more 
functional, they ultimately lack the nuance and insight that in-depth, open-ended 
interviews can provide.  The little work done on perceptions of social mobility 
in South Africa tends to suffer from these same shortcomings. 
 
The few authors who have indirectly waded into the difficult task of trying to 
catalogue perceptions of social mobility in South Africa have discovered that in 
fact perceptions do differ greatly from reality.  Burns (2009: 7-12), in an attempt 
to uncover perceptions of social cohesion in South Africa using data from the 
first wave of NIDS, concluded that there was “an expectation of significant 
upward economic mobility” among South Africans in all locations of the 
income distribution; only 18 percent of those in the lowest quintile, for example, 
expected to remain there over the subsequent two years, with over two-thirds of 
these individuals predicting that their income would gain at least 17 percent 
compared to the average South African.  These expectations, however, appear 
largely unfounded in the existing literature (see, supra, at 8-10).   
 
Similarly, Bray et al. (2010: 217-9), who examined expectations of educational 
attainment among Cape Town youth and their parents, found that respondents 
also tended to greatly overestimate their educational potential.  Posel (2012: 5-
11), in her exploration of subjective wellbeing in South Africa using data from 
the first two waves of NIDS, found that individuals were particularly bad at 








underestimated their comparative wealth). Moreover, in 2008, nearly three-
quarters of these individuals expected to experience upward relative mobility 
within two years; this number had fallen to 50 percent by 2010, presumably 
reflecting the impact of the global economic downturn on the economy of South 
Africa. 
 
To date, Wale (2012) has engaged in perhaps the most concerted effort to 
uncover perceptions of social mobility in South Africa.  In her chapter in the 
forthcoming Classifying Soweto, a collection of essays on conceptions of class 
in townships outside Johannesburg, Wale drew on qualitative interviews with a 
non-random subset of the 2,550 respondents who were part of a 2006 survey run 
by the University of Johannesburg that was designed in part to uncover 
perceptions of class mobility.  Wale demonstrates that class consciousness is 
deeply rooted in concepts of “consumption” and that these conceptions of class 
in Soweto profoundly impact definitions of mobility (i.e. mobility is viewed 
through the prism of material acquisition).  Wale ultimately argues that 
respondents presented both “individualistic explanations” of social capital that 
highlighted the importance of hard work and determination and “structural 
explanations” that emphasised the high barriers of unemployment and access to 
capital.  Although Wale’s research is an important contribution to the 
investigation of perceptions of social mobility in South Africa, it ultimately 
differs significantly from this paper; instead of focusing on respondents’ 
mobility experiences as this paper does, she instead focused on self-described 
class position of the interviewees when drawing conclusions. 
 
Although a few authors have attempted to uncover perceptions of social 
mobility in South Africa, this important task has been largely neglected by 
South African scholars, as in much of Africa.  As the social anthropologist Peter 
C. Lloyd (1974: 4) bemoaned (in characteristically colonial and gendered terms) 
over 35 years ago in the introduction to his classic study of inequality and social 
mobility in Nigeria: 
 
‘Whatever might be the validity of [the existing literature], 
conspicuous by absence from this literature is any discussion of the 
African’s own view of his society.  What does he think about the 
inequalities described above?  How does he view his opportunities?  
His actions, in accepting his society or protesting, are founded upon 
his image of this society and we cannot understand or explain them 









In South Africa at least, Lloyd’s observations remain mostly true. 
 
This study seeks to address this yawning gap in the current literature on social 
mobility in South Africa.  Through twelve in-depth ethnographic interviews 
with black South Africans, this study attempts to uncover perceptions of social 
mobility in Cape Town.  However, this study is not merely interested in whether 
or not South Africans believe that they are economically mobile; by surveying a 
number of individuals from diverse economic backgrounds, this paper begins to 
investigate how selected black South Africans in one part of the country 
conceptualise their economic environment, why they believe certain individuals 






The purpose of this study was to gauge perceptions of social mobility among 
black individuals in Cape Town, South Africa.  Although black Africans 
represent a minority (27 percent) of Cape Town residents (Biddlecom and 
Bakilana, 2003: 7), they constitute the vast majority (80 percent) of South 
Africans.  Black South Africans were the individuals most disadvantaged by 
apartheid policies, both economically and socially.  Thus, black South Africans’ 
perceptions are particularly important to the study of social mobility in South 
Africa. 
 
In order to gauge perceptions of social mobility, a series of twelve in-depth 
ethnographic interviews were conducted with individuals from diverse 
economic backgrounds during May and June of 2012.  The interview questions 
(see Appendix A) were developed specifically to probe how the interview 
subjects conceptualise their economic position in South African society.  Many 
of these questions were adapted from the 2005 Cape Area Study (CAS) survey 
questionnaire.  However, unlike the CAS, individuals were not asked to choose 
from a number of prescribed responses; rather, those interviewed were given an 
opportunity to formulate their own answers to the questions and to elaborate on 
their responses at length.  Ultimately, the questions served as a guide during the 

















Because the focus of the study was social mobility, the study sought to 
interview a sample of individuals with diverse mobility experiences.  To 
accomplish this goal, the population was divided into four categories depending 
on both background and outcome (see Figure 1).  The first category consists of 
individuals who were from “disadvantaged” backgrounds and have experienced 
little, if any, upward mobility (have had relatively “unsuccessful” outcomes); 
the second category consists of individuals who were from “disadvantaged” 
backgrounds, but have experienced a considerable degree of upward mobility 
(have had relatively “successful” outcomes); the third category consists of those 
who were from “advantaged” backgrounds but have since experienced 
considerable downward mobility; and finally, the fourth category consists of 
those who were from “advantaged” backgrounds and remain in their 
“advantaged” position today.  Because there is little significant downward 
mobility for those already near the top of the income distribution (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2006: 336; see also Finn, Leibbrandt and Levinsohn, 2012: 18), the 
third category - those who were from “advantaged” backgrounds but have had 
“unsuccessful” outcomes - is less relevant to the South African experience and 
was thus largely disregarded during the study.  
 
Those interviewed from the first two categories (i.e., those from 
“disadvantaged” backgrounds) were randomly selected from participants in the 
fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS).  CAPS, a joint effort of the 
Population Studies Center in the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Michigan and the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of 








selected Cape Town residents who were between the ages of 14 and 22 when 
the study began in 2002.  The study has since completed five waves, the most 
recent of which was in 2009 (Lam et al., 2008 2; http://www.caps.uct.ac.za/). 
 
This study’s sample was first restricted to only black African young people 
surveyed in wave five of CAPS.  Because the focus of the study is social 
mobility, the sample was further restricted to include just those who were under 
the age of 25 in 2009 (who were born after 1984), as those who are most likely 
to have nuanced expectations about their futures.  Finally, unemployment at the 
time of data collection in 2009 was used as a proxy for “disadvantaged” 
background.  The remaining 409 individuals were then randomised and 
individuals were sequentially contacted until four interview subjects were 
identified for each category.  During this process, unemployment and 
underemployment were used to proxy for “unsuccessful” outcomes, or a lack of 
considerable upward mobility, while full-time employment was used as a proxy 
for “successful” outcomes.  It should be noted that only those who had at least 
one phone number that was the same as the numbers recorded in 2009 were 
contacted for interviews, introducing potential bias into the sample of 
individuals selected.4 
 
A different approach was taken in order to identify subjects for the third group 
of interest for this study: those from “advantaged” positions that have had 
“successful” outcomes, or those in category four.  According to Seekings 
(2011a: 27), “A major concern with any survey is the difficulty of interviewing 
rich households.” And as Seekings indicates, there is no reason to believe that 
this non-response among wealthier households is non-random.  Furthermore, 
some of those in the CAPS study who came from “advantaged” backgrounds 
were university students, many of whom most likely left Cape Town upon 
completion of their degrees.  Thus, because of the potentially confounding 
effects of these biases, interview candidates for category four were selected 
through purposive sampling.  The individuals targeted for category four were 
UCT students from either middle or upper class backgrounds, who had been in 
Cape Town for at least two years.  Although attending UCT is an imperfect 
measure of “success” in the social-mobility sense, students at UCT can expect 
successful outcomes when they graduate and enter the labor market and most 
likely have already begun to internalise these successful outcomes. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Having the same phone number for three years suggests a certain degree of financial 
security, as it implies that an individual was able to pay his or her phone bills during the 








Each of the twelve individuals selected to participate in this study were 
interviewed for approximately one hour.  The arguments that follow are based 
entirely on a careful examination and coding of these interviews.  This 
qualitative analysis sought to identify continuities and discontinuities among the 
different groups interviewed and to uncover gender, location and age-based 
patterns.  Although this study lacks statistical significance and only represents 
the perceptions of social mobility of black Africans in one South African city, it 
offers preliminary insights into an underexplored subject and offers one 
potential model for future inquiries.   
 
 
A Brief Introduction to the Study’s Subjects 
 
The twelve interviewees ranged in age between 20 and 29 years old.  Although 
most of the interviewees from disadvantaged backgrounds were either born in 
Cape Town or had lived in Cape Town for a significant period of time, none of 
the UCT students had lived in Cape Town for longer than two years.  No 
deliberate attempt was made to recruit a gender-balanced sample; thus two more 
men were interviewed than women.  All the interviews were conducted in 
English except for one, which was conducted in Xhosa through a translator. 
 
All of the UCT students interviewed lived in UCT residence halls in Cape 
Town’s southern suburbs and were all third-year students, although none of 
them was studying for the same degree.  UCT-1 is a 20 year-old male studying 
business science from a medium-sized city near Johannesburg, where he 
attended a primarily white high school.  His mother works for the Department 
of Education and his father is a high school principal.  UCT-2 is a 20 year-old 
medical student from Mpumalanga, where his father is an engineer in a mine 
and his mother is a primary-school teacher.  UCT-3 is a 21 year-old woman 
from a wealthy household.  Her father is an executive at an investment bank and 
her mother is a university professor, and she is studying for a social science 
degree at UCT.  Finally, UCT-4 is a 20 year-old female from Durban.  Her 
mother is a nurse and single mother, and at UCT she is studying social science. 
 
The interviewees from disadvantaged backgrounds, in categories 1 and 2, all 
live in townships in the Khayelitsha vicinity.  All of those in category 2 were 
employed at the time of the interviews in 2012, but not all of the individuals 
were equally happy with their employment.  KS-1, for example, is a 28 year-old 
woman who works as a protection officer at Metrorail.  She is extremely happy 








children of her own, she supports her mother and two brothers, in addition to an 
uncle who is also in Cape Town, and a grandmother in the Eastern Cape.  She is 
in the process of building a house for her family.  In contrast, KS-2 is a 27 year-
old woman who is married with a son.  Together, they live in an informal shack 
in Greenpoint.  Although she leads a sales team at a retail store, she has a degree 
in management and cannot find work in her desired field.  The third individual 
interviewed in category 2, KS-7, is a 27 year-old man who has two children but 
is unmarried.  He works full time as a bookbinder but aspires to be a fashion 
designer.  Finally, KS-8 is a 29 year-old man who works six days a week at a 
post office in Haut Bay.  Because of his previous experiences with 
unemployment, he is happy with his job and is able to support his two children 
and wife, and still set aside money every month for his mother. 
 
All of those interviewed in category 1 were either unemployed or 
underemployed in mid-2012.  KU-3 is a 25 year-old woman who is married to a 
taxi driver and together they have a four year-old daughter.  Although she has 
had some experience in the formal workforce, she is currently unemployed and 
her daughter lives with her mother for financial reasons.  KU-4 is a 24 year-old 
man who is a student at Cape Peninsula University of Technology.  He can only 
occasionally find “part time” jobs, although he needs the income to help support 
himself and his studies.  KU-5 is a 29 year-old carpenter who is only able to 
find transient work.  Although he migrated from the Eastern Cape to Cape 
Town twelve years ago, he speaks very little English and the interview was 
conducted in Xhosa.  He has no children but supports his sister and her child.  
Finally, KU-6 is a 27 year-old man who works as a gardener.  He used to be 
able to find steadier work for up to five or six months at a time, but now has 
only “one garden” to tend.  KU-6 was probably the poorest interviewee; he 
repeatedly mentioned that there were days when he did not have anything to eat 









Table 1: Categorisation of interviewees 
 






KU-3, KU-4, KU-5, KU-6 KS-1, KS-2, KS-7, KS-8 
Advantaged 
Background 
 UCT-1, UCT-2, UCT-3, UCT-4 
 
 
Results: Perceptions of Social Mobility Among 
Black Individuals in Cape Town  
 
This section offers findings from a detailed analysis of the twelve interviews 
conducted in the study.5  Through a close reading of the interviews, similarities 
and differences among the three groups of interviewees are probed.  The section 
is divided into three parts. First, how respondents conceptualise the economic 
stratification of South African society is explored, highlighting the continued 
association of wealth and race for many of those interviewed.  Then, mobility 
pathways emphasised during the interviews are critically examined.  Finally, 
this section ends with an investigation of expectations of both intra-generational 
and intergenerational mobility among the twelve respondents, which appear to 
be closely related to previous mobility experiences. 
 
 
“It [is] still blacks at the bottom and white people at 
the top”: Conceptions of the Economic Stratification 
of South Africa 
 
Although this paper is primarily concerned with perceptions of social mobility 
among black individuals in Cape Town, social mobility has important relative 
dimensions (Pearce, 2011: 4).  It is therefore necessary to first explore how 
interviewees conceptualise the economic stratification of South African society, 
to try to uncover the respondents’ frame of reference, before interrogating how 
these individuals imagine their own mobility.  In order to facilitate discussion 
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about the distribution of income in South African society, respondents were 
given a copy of Figure 2, which was used in the 2005 Cape Areas Study, and 
read a version of the following: 
 
These four pictures show different types of society.  The first picture 
represents a society with a small elite of rich people at the top, a few 
people in the middle, and a large number of poor people at the 
bottom.  The second picture represents a society that is like a 
pyramid, with a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and 
a lot of poor people at the bottom.  The third picture shows a society 
in which most people are in the middle.  The fourth picture shows a 
society with lots of people at the top, some in the middle, and very 
few at the bottom.  Which of these pictures, in your view, describes 
South Africa today? 
 
 
Figure 2: Pictures depicting different models of the economic 










Although analysis of CAS data found “only a weak relationship between self-
placement on the rich/poor scale and how respondents saw society” (Seekings, 
2007: 24), there appears to be a correlation between mobility experiences and 
how individuals conceptualised the distribution of wealth in South Africa. Table 
2 shows that seven of the eight individuals in category 1 (those who come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds who have experienced little mobility) and category 
4 (those from advantaged backgrounds who have had “successful” outcomes) 
chose type 1 when asked how they would describe South African society.  On 
the other hand, three of the four interviewed from category 2 (those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds who have experienced some degree of upward 
social mobility) selected type 2.6 
 
 
Table 2: Conceptualisation of the distribution of income in South Africa 
by mobility category 
 
Category Type 1  
(# of individuals) 
Type 2  
(# of individuals) 
Type 3  
(# of individuals) 
Type 4  
(# of individuals) 
1 (KU) 3 1 0 0 
2 (KS) 1 3 0 0 
4 (UCT) 4 0 0 0 
 
 
In their responses, the interviewees gave some indication as to why conceptions 
of South African society’s economic stratification may be influenced by 
experiences of social mobility.  Those who had experienced little social 
mobility - those in categories 1 and 4 - tended to emphasise the insurmountable 
gap between rich and poor that ultimately precluded the emergence of a middle 
class.   
 
For example, UCT-2, the medical student, lamented “the huge gap between the 
rich and the poor … [Thus,] there is no place for your middle-class [] South 
African, per se, because it’s stretched out so much.  You have the two extremes 
and no middle class.”  UCT-4, the industrial sociology major, concurred: “I 
think if you’re at the bottom, there is a very little chance of you getting up” 
because “there’s a big gap between the rich and the poor - that’s why there’s not 
a lot of middle income people.”  Similarly, KU-3, the unemployed wife of the 
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taxi driver, described how “there is just those few people with money … [and] 
all of us are at the bottom because we’ve got nothing at all.  Even there is no 
work, there is nothing, so it’s a lot of us at the bottom.” 
 
In contrast, those in category 2, perhaps because they have experienced some 
degree of upward mobility, could better imagine pathways from the bottom to 
the top and thus highlighted the presence of a robust middle class by selecting 
type 2.  KS-8, the postal worker, recognised that “there are not too many people 
in South Africa who have got wealth” and that “most of [the people] … have 
got nowhere to dig, they’ve got nowhere to go to,” but “in the middle are those 
who are trying to make it and trying by all means. … Those in the middle are 
those who is trying.”  And KS-1, the Metrorail employee, described how she 
“know[s] there is a middle class” by saying, “There are rich people” and “there 
are still people who don’t have” but there are also “the people who are not rich, 
[but] are working hard now to get the balance, to be able to send the children to 
school, to be able to get decent medical help or whatever things like that.” 
 
Although there was disagreement over how exactly South African society was 
stratified economically - particularly over whether or not there was a robust 
middle class - there was general agreement on the racialised nature of this 
stratification.  Nearly all interviewees identified the top of the distribution as 
being predominantly white and the bottom as being entirely black.  KS-2, for 
example, argued that “the whites [were at the top].  The white is the richest,” 
while the blacks were “in the lower level.”  Similarly, UCT-1 indicated that he 
would “characterise [the distribution of wealth] from a racial point of view”. He 
described how being “rich” meant being in “the top class, living in the nicer 
suburbs, your Constantias, where there are very few black people” while being 
“poor” meant “living in the townships, where you won’t find a white face.”  
Although most recognised that there were black Africans at the top of the 
distribution, they tended to argue as KU-4 did, that “it’s just a portion of black 
people who are rich.  The majority though are poor and then also coloured 
people - the majority are poor.”  UCT-4 summarised the general sentiment of 
the majority of the respondents well: “I’d say black people are at the bottom, … 
a good mixture in the middle, and at the top, a lot of white people and maybe [a 
few of them] of them are black.”  Thus, as UCT-2 ultimately concluded, “It [is] 
still blacks at the bottom and white people at the top. … [It is split] along racial 
lines, very racial.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
However, these perceptions of a racialised distribution of wealth in South Africa 








structured the labor market, growth path and welfare benefits of South Africa to 
benefit white constituents, beginning in the 1970s race became increasingly less 
important for reproducing privilege (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 6, 91).  In 
fact, by 2000, the upper classes were nearly as black as they were white (see 
Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 66; Seekings and Nattrass, 306).  As Nattrass and 
Seekings (2001: 47) conclude, “In South Africa, black and white are no longer 
synonymous with rich and poor” (emphasis in original). 
 
What then explains this disconnect between perception and reality?  Part of the 
discontinuity can perhaps be attributed to the unique demographics of Cape 
Town.  Although there are nearly as many non-whites as whites at the top of the 
income distribution nationally, the “urban privileged,” according to Seekings 
(Forthcoming: 12), “are in Cape Town, [still] predominantly but not exclusively 
white.  In other parts of the country this category is more thoroughly multi-
racial.”  But this explanation may have less salience than initially appears.  All 
of those in category 4 - those from advantaged backgrounds now attending UCT 
- are not originally from Cape Town but they still conveyed a deeply racialised 
understanding of the distribution of income.  Moreover, many of the black 
Africans at UCT come from relatively well-to-do backgrounds.  But this too 
seems to have had little impact on the perceptions of interviewees in category 4.  
As UCT-2 observed, “At UCT, you see a lot of black people here and you think 
there’s a lot of people making it.  But personally I think that it’s a very small 
amount looking at South Africa as a whole.” 
 
Additionally, these perceptions may reflect the views espoused by South 
Africa’s political leaders.  As Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 342-5) and others 
have highlighted, South African politicians continue to fallaciously assert that 
the distribution of wealth in South Africa has changed little since the height of 
apartheid.  Perhaps most famously, then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki 
famously argued in his “Two Nations” speech, 
 
‘We … make bold to say that South Africa is a country of two 
nations.  One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, 
regardless of gender or geographic dispersal.  It has ready access to a 
developed economic, physical, educational, communication and 
other infrastructure. … The second and larger nation of South Africa 
is black and poor’ (Mbeki, 19 May 1998, as quoted in Hadland and 









As recently as June 2012, South Africa’s current president, Jacob Zuma, 
asserted that “the economic power relations of the apartheid era have in the 
main remained intact.  The ownership of the economy is still primarily in the 
hands of white males as it has always been” (26 June 2012).  Maurencia Gillion, 
a senior ANC leader in the Western Cape, echoed Zuma’s position to The New 
York Times (Polgreen, 2012) later that day: “The rich white people [in 
Overstand] live in their beautiful holiday homes.  The rest are in slums, in 
squatter areas.  Even after 18 years, in reality apartheid remains.” 
 
During this study’s interviews, however, a third and perhaps more salient 
explanation emerged in that many of the respondents conflated race with class - 
they ascribed white characteristics to all those at the top of the income 
distribution and ascribed black characteristics to all of those at the bottom.  For 
example, KU-5 asked, “[Who are the] people who have money? ... They are 
white.”  And KS-7 described how “black is poor” (emphasis added).  This 
association of class with certain racialised characteristics was perhaps most 
clearly articulated by UCT-3, who painted black people in the relatively small 
middle class as “having a crisis of identity,” caught between black (being in the 
lower class) and white (being in the upper class): 
 
‘People that are in the middle class, hav[e] a crisis of identity: “Who 
am I?”  Because if you go back to the township and use twang or 
speak with an accent or you articulate properly, it’s like you’re 
making yourself better and you’re moving away from the blackness.  
And when you go to school you get the same thing because you’re 
louder by volume than the other people. … “I’m black but I’m not 
black enough to be black.”  There’s a class where you’re ghetto, 
you’re model C, you’re coconut: there are certain places where 
you’re black, but you’re not black enough to be black.’ 
 
This trend has been documented by others. Alexander (2007: 104) argues that 
this conceptualisation of class is common among “township youth” and the 
word “coconut” - a fruit that is black on the outside and white on the inside - is 
frequently used to describe upper class black South Africans (see e.g., Matlwa, 
2007).  Thus, the racialised perceptions of South Africa’s economic 
stratification expressed by the interviewees could, in part, reflect the tendency to 










Summary Table 1: Economic stratification 
 














Most respondents from category 1, 
because they had experienced little 
upward mobility, tended to emphasise 
an insurmountable gap between the 
rich and the poor that ultimately 
precluded the emergence of a middle 
class by selecting type 1.  Respondents 
stressed that those at the top of the 
income distribution are mostly white, 
while those at the bottom are all black. 
Those in category 2, because they 
have experienced some degree of 
upward mobility, could better 
imagine pathways from the bottom 
to the top, and thus highlighted the 
presence of a robust middle class by 
selecting type 2.  Respondents from 
category 2, however, also viewed the 
upper classes as predominantly white 
and the lower classes as 













 All respondents from category 4, 
because they had experienced neither 
upward nor downward mobility, also 
highlighted the large gap between 
rich and poor and lack of a middle 
class by selecting type 1.  Those in 
category 4, despite being exposed to 
a large number of successful black 
individuals while at UCT, still 
conceptualised the distribution of 




“The long and winding road”: Pathways to 
Success (and Failure) 
 
During the interviews, the respondents emphasised a number of characteristics 
of the upwardly and downwardly mobile.  A close reading of the interviews was 
undertaken in an attempt to identify the key mobility pathways stressed by 
interviewees.  Respondents highlighted three paths that often led to economic 
success: education, hard work, and connections to government officials and 








This section critically examines the pathways identified by the interviewees, 
paying careful attention to how mobility experience influences 
conceptualisations of these pathways.  
 
 
“Education is the key for everything!” 
 
The relationship between educational achievement and standard of living in 
South Africa is well documented (Louw, Van der Berg and Yu, 2007: 549; 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2006: 265).  Bhorat (2004: 951) found that employment 
is positively and exponentially related to educational level, and Statistics South 
Africa (2010: x) found that median monthly income increased with level of 
education.  Keswell and Poswell (2004: 835 and 844), however, point to the 
particular importance of tertiary education for upward mobility. They found that 
while the marginal rate of return for education is near zero for lower levels of 
education (less than 10 years), the return on education for those with tertiary 
qualifications increases markedly. 
 
Because of the strong correlation between education and standard of living, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that all of those interviewed recognised the importance of 
education to upward mobility.  Education was understood as a prerequisite for 
gaining access to the labor market, and ultimately for economic success.  As 
KS-2, the sales associate, argued, “It is possible [for a poor person to become 
rich]…if you study, [you] get a job, [then] it’s possible.”  Her sentiment was 
echoed by KU-5, the unemployed carpenter: “People in general get jobs when 
they are educated.”  Therefore, KU-5 saw education as the defining 
characteristic between the rich and the poor: “If you take a closer look, most 
people who are rich are those who are educated and then the poor are those who 
are uneducated.”  As KS-7, the book binder, concluded, “Education is the key 
for everything!  Any job! ... The door is open.  You put the key inside the door 
[and it] will open!” 
 
Among those in categories 2 and 4, however, there was a creeping awareness 
that education alone was no longer enough to achieve upward mobility.  This 
reflects Girdwood and Leibbrandt’s (2009: 6, 11, 22) finding that, despite high 
degrees of educational mobility in South African society, there has been much 
less occupational mobility.  Most attributed this trend to increasingly stringent 
qualification demands set by prospective employers.  KS-2, the same woman 
who argued that a poor person could become rich through education, also 








“most of the cases [employers] say [you] need experience, maybe five years of 
experience.”  “How will you get experience of three years or five years,” she 
bemoaned, “when you are coming from university?”  UCT-3 argued, “Even 
now, currently, it’s not enough to get a degree, whether it’s a master’s degree, 
an honors degree.  It doesn’t really hold much value, because companies are 
asking for experience.”  According to KS-8, the postal worker, this reality is 
increasingly discouraging individuals from seeking an education:  
 
‘There are people you find, they are educated, they’ve got diplomas, 
they’ve got degrees and then they tell [you], ‘I can’t get a job!’ and then 
you like ‘How?’ and they say they don’t know … And the other person is 
going to be like ‘Why should I bother to go to school?  Because there is a 
guy who has got Masters and degrees sitting there—he doesn’t get a job!’  
 
Ultimately, however, most still viewed education as beneficial. “Nowadays they 
want experience.  But how can you get experience if you don’t have the job?” 
KS-1 asked.  “But I think it’s better to be educated than not.” 
 
Despite the general consensus on the importance of education to upward 
mobility, there was widespread disagreement over why those from poorer 
backgrounds did not then get educated.  Those in categories 1 and 2 - those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds and, thus less educated on average - faulted 
structural disadvantages, mainly poverty and lack of resources, for hindering 
educational mobility. KS-7 argued, “Education is there for everybody, but [you 
need] money—if the money is there for everybody, everybody will find 
[education].”  Most in category 2 - those who had already experienced a degree 
of mobility - focused primarily on the prohibitive cost of tertiary education. KS-
2 described how “there is a lot of people … who can’t afford universities.”  
Similarly, KS-7 contended that “there are many good people, … [but] they just 
passed Grade 12. … Now they have got no cash to go and study—to go into 
university or colleges.”  In contrast, those in category 1 - those who have 
experienced less mobility - emphasised how poverty prevented individuals from 
attaining even lower levels of education.  As KU-3, the unemployed wife of the 













‘The parents don’t even have money for the children to go to school. 
… Some of them dropped out from school because of hunger.  You 
know?  Or because of statuses—some of them they go to school and 
they don’t have shoes and “why should I go to school?  I’ve got no 
shoes! I’ve got no clothes on my back!”  Some of them end up 
thinking that they go look for a job and drop out of school.’ 
 
Although those from advantaged backgrounds recognised the presence of 
structural barriers, they tended to blame individuals for not taking advantage of 
the educational opportunities available to them, and their communities for not 
supporting their educational aspirations.  UCT-1, the business science major, 
recognised the high “cost of becoming skilled” but ultimately attributed high 
dropout rates to shortsightedness: “There’s pressure from parents who say 
actually go get a job by the time they’re in ninth grade and they’re actually 
legally able to drop out they say, ‘Go get a job, there needs to be money in the 
house.’  It’s very short-sighted and I think that’s one of the main issues in South 
Africa, a lot of the black race is short-sighted rather than long-sighted.”  
Similarly, UCT-2, in response to a question asking why certain individuals fail 
to enroll in varsity, replied,  
 
‘There is always the story of black South Africans being complacent and 
not utilising the opportunities that they’ve been given. It’s the conditions 
that people live in. You’re not groomed to think varsity is the best option; 
you’re groomed to think that getting a job and making money is because 
of the situation that you’re in.’ 
 
The truth, however, probably lies somewhere in the middle.  Seekings and 
Nattrass (2006: 330) identify a confluence of factors that hinder educational 
mobility among the lower classes, including a lack of a “culture of learning” in 
poorer areas, parents who are less motivated, less spending (and probably ability 
to spend) on education among the poor, and home environments that fail to 
encourage students.  But these views potentially reveal a fundamental paradox 
in South African society: although most of those interviewed correctly 
recognise the importance of education to mobility, there appear to be deep 
structural (and perhaps behavioral) barriers preventing a large portion of South 












Summary Table 2:  Education 
 














Respondents in category 1 recognised 
the importance of education for 
upward mobility.  However, those in 
category 1 highlighted the large 
structural barriers—in particular, 
poverty—to educational attainment. 
Although those in category 2 also 
stressed the importance of education 
for upward mobility, most believed 
that education alone did not guarantee 
economic success.  However, those in 
category 2 stressed the prohibitive 
cost of tertiary education as the major 













 All respondents from UCT were 
confident that their UCT education 
would ensure economic opportunity 
later in life, but also recognised that 
for some, education alone was not 
enough to guarantee this opportunity.  
Although those in category 4 
recognised the presence of structural 
barriers to educational attainment, 
they ultimately faulted individuals 
and their communities for not valuing 
education and failing to capitalise on 
the educational opportunities 
















“Black South Africans are lazy”: Working Hard to 
Move Up? 
 
During the interviews, two very different conceptualisations of social mobility 
emerged.  Those in categories 2 and 4 - those who had either experienced social 
mobility themselves or were from relatively advantaged backgrounds - tended 
to offer “individualistic” explanations, meaning the opinion that “individuals are 
responsible for their relative positions within” society, for social mobility and 
believed that social grants hindered upward mobility by insulating individuals 
from this individual responsibility.  In contrast, those who had experienced little 
mobility and remained disadvantaged - those in category 1 - recognised the 
importance of hard work, yet tended to emphasise “structural” explanations for 
their lack of mobility and saw social grants as necessary protection from an 
unsympathetic economic system (Wale, 2012: 156). 
 
Interviewees from categories 2 and 4 repeatedly stressed that opportunities, and 
thus upward mobility, were available for those willing to work hard for them.  
KS-1 described how  
 
‘There [are opportunities] if you are willing to work for it. … You have 
to work hard. … There is no other way around it. Anything can get you to 
the top, if you work hard on it. Because even now at my position at 
Metrorail as a protection officer, I know that if I work hard, then there is 
a chance that I will get the opportunity to get something more.’ 
 
Similarly, UCT-1 argued,  
 
‘I think it’s initiative and perseverance at the end of the day.  You know, 
if you’re wanting to stick it out and you’re able to stick it out then you’ll 
enjoy the fruits at the end of the day by getting that job.  If you’re 
continuously trying to push yourself then you’ll be able to get to where 
you want to be.’ 
 
Those from disadvantaged backgrounds who have not experienced upward 
mobility, e.g. those who have not been able to take advantage of these 
“opportunities”, are thus seen as “lazy.”  KS-2 argued that “before we did not 
have a lot of people who were having those opportunities and now we have the 
opportunities, a lot of opportunities.  [It’s] just that the people don’t use them.”  
As UCT-3 concluded, in response to a question about why South Africans do 








lazy.  They are complacent.  They feel they are entitled.  They’re dreamers and 
they’re not implementers.”  These perceptions are not unique to this sample and 
seem to be widely held by those who have experienced some degree of social 
mobility. An analysis of labor market dynamics in Cape Town (Seekings, 
Forthcoming: 13) identified at least one individual who expressed very similar 
sentiments about the black unemployed. 
 
Interestingly, nearly all of those who believed that hard work could facilitate 
mobility faulted social grants for facilitating the “laziness” of those with 
relatively unsuccessful outcomes.  South Africa inherited an extraordinarily 
expansive, if racialised, welfare system from its apartheid past (Matisonn and 
Seekings, 2002: 2-3). These generous levels of social spending were not only 
maintained after South Africa’s transition to democracy, but were greatly 
increased, driven primarily by an unprecedented doubling, in real terms, of 
spending for means tested social assistance programs between 1994 and 2006 to 
nearly 3.5 percent of GDP.  The rapid growth in social assistance spending is 
most directly attributable to the introduction of the Child Support Grant (CSG) 
in 1998, which by 2006 reached over 8 million children (Seekings, 2008b: 29-
32). 
 
Although social grants in general were faulted for hindering social mobility, 
particular ire was directed at the CSG.  KS-8, for example, described how there 
are  
‘Those people [who] are just like “I am going to depend on a pension!” 
You see? Some of them in the bottom I will take them as—I won’t say 
they are lazy—I will take them as the people … who don’t want to go and 
find something. Ja, because there are those people who say “I am what I 
am so why should I!” you know? “I’ve got a pension, so why should I 
bother?”’   
 
Similarly, as KS-1 argued in response to a question about why more people in 
Khayelitsha were not working,  
 
‘Some are waiting for the government money—because teenagers are 
having children waiting for the grant money.  You don’t see them 
opening up a place maybe to sell fruit and veg—they don’t do that.  You 
don’t see them going to find work.  Most of the time they just live month 










As she also argued earlier in the interview, “If the government can stop that 
grant money, especially the youngsters … will get up and go and find work, 
finish school.” 
 
It is important to note that these views do not necessarily reflect growing neo-
liberal sympathies among Cape Townians and opposition to social welfare 
spending generally.  Rather, they reflect the largely incorrect belief that young 
women purposefully get pregnant in order to receive government grants (see 
Richter, 2009: 92).  UCT-1 argued that “people [] live in a bubble of … ‘The 
more kids I have the higher the grant is going to be.’”  UCT-2 concurred: 
“Women are given grants for having children … That’s not going to help … I 
know people who get children just so that they can get a grant.”  The negative 
views of the CSG were compounded by the impression that mothers did not 
spend the grant money on their children.  UCT-3 argued, “I think that very few 
people - in my personal experience and I’ve seen people - very few of them 
actually use that money” correctly.  And KS-7 asserted that when “you give that 
lady [a grant], she will say ‘it’s my money’ … [And] she goes and drinks with 
the other boyfriend!”.  Ultimately, however, most felt that the money spent on 
grants should be put to more productive social uses.  As UCT-3 concluded, 
“We’re financially constrained … and yet government finds projects that don’t 
really equip us. … We spend 62 billion, if I’m not mistaken—yea, 62 billion—
on grants, and that’s about four percent of our GDP. … We are blocking other 
venues of development because we could use the same amount of money for 
something else, for education for example, or for health.” 
 
Wale (2012: 156-7), who found a similar trend in her study of class in Soweto, 
argues that “the assumption underpinning this view is that the opportunities of a 
better life are there for the taking.  Responsibility is [thus] placed on the 
individual to” take advantage of these opportunities.  Williams (2006: 430, 440; 
see also Wale, 2012: 159) offers a potential explanation for why this 
individualistic understanding of social mobility may be so prevalent.  The media, 
which Williams argues “select[s], defin[es], and communicat[es] pertinent 
issues in society,” has valorised the free market and presumably capitalism’s 
emphasis on the individual, while downplaying structural obstacles.  Thus, it is 
possible that those in categories 2 and 4 are merely conceptualising their own 
success within the popular discourse about the topic.  And Williams’ (2006) 
framework may also help to explain why so many of those in categories 2 and 4 
attributed the failure to achieve upward mobility to the CSG, which is often 









In contrast, those from category 1 tended to offer structural explanations for 
their lack of mobility. They highlighted the fickleness of life, emphasised the 
dearth of available opportunities, and argued that social grants were a necessary 
hedge against bad luck.  KU-4, although recognising the importance of “do[ing] 
whatever” he could to seek out opportunities, ultimately felt that hard work was 
inadequate because these opportunities “aren’t easily accessible for poor people.  
People can’t access the opportunities.”  As he concluded, “These things you 
don’t know when they happen but you just pray and hope that maybe one day 
you can be somewhere.”  Similarly, KU-5 bemoaned that “I would like to see 
myself rich, but I don’t know what I can do” because, as he argued earlier, 
“there are [some] opportunities, but there are not many.”  He concluded that the 
government should “increase the old age pension. And also increase the child 




Summary Table 3:  Hard work 
 













d Those in category 1 tended to offer 
structural explanations for their lack of 
mobility and stressed the importance 
of social grants as a necessary hedge 
against life’s fickleness and a dearth of 
available opportunities. 
Those in category 2, because they 
had experienced some degree of 
upward mobility, stressed that 
opportunities were available for 
those who were willing to work for 
them.  They faulted those from 
category 1 for not taking advantages 
of the opportunities available to them 













d  Those in category 4 similarly 
presented an individualistic 
understanding of social mobility in 
South Africa: those who failed to 
experience mobility lacked initiative 
and perseverance; social grants 








Social Capital and Government Patronage: a More 
Meritocratic Top, a Nepotistic Bottom 
 
Respondents from the three mobility categories highlighted the importance of 
government patronage, nepotism and social capital for upward mobility, but 
opinions were not uniform across all of the categories.  While those from 
advantaged backgrounds tended to view their opportunities for mobility as 
mostly meritocratic, those from disadvantaged backgrounds were much less 
optimistic.  Individuals in category 2, despite emphasising the potential for hard 
work and education to yield success, argued that the probability of success was 
undermined by nepotism, connections to government contractors and a lack of 
social capital.  Those from category 1 ultimately felt that their lack of social 
capital greatly circumscribed their opportunities for climbing the social ladder. 
 
Although those in category 4 recognised social capital and government 
patronage as an important mobility route, they still saw abundant opportunity 
for meritocratic advancement.  UCT-4, for example, argued that some of those 
who have reached the top did so because of “who [they] know” and “who they 
were previously affiliated with.”  But she also highlighted that there are 
individuals who gained “opportunities when they were once at the bottom”, 
independent of government and network connections.  Similarly, UCT-1 argued 
that “there are definitely … two separate groups of the black middle to upper 
class.  [There are] those who have benefited through the government and then 
there are those who have done it for themselves.”  Interestingly, Black 
Economic Empowerment and affirmative action - two government programs 
established to remedy past disadvantages in the employment and business 
sectors - were not seen as weakening South Africa’s meritocracy.  Rather, these 
programs, according to UCT-2, were seen as “empower[ing]” individuals and 
thus bolstering meritocratic paths.  UCT-2’s major complaint about the 
programs is that more “black people are … not [] empowered.”  As UCT-1 
described, “It’s so difficult to obtain wealth, from a very, very closed, I would 
go so far as to say white, wealth-held majority” that such structures are 
necessary so that more people can “start up your own thing” and stand on their 
own. 
 
While emphasising hard work and education as fruitful paths to upward 
mobility, those in category 2 believed that their potential for mobility was 
ultimately circumscribed by nepotism and a lack of access to social capital.  KS-








don’t use [them],” described how personal connections still played a prominent 
role in the hiring process: 
 
‘It’s not easy to find jobs nowadays, unless you know somebody 
who is already there and [he] make[s] a way for you to get in.  It’s 
working like that in these days.  If you do not know anybody in that 
department or in that company, it’s less [likely you will] get a job 
there, even if you have experience.  In most cases they take people 
they know, like relatives or whoever they know.’ 
 
Similarly, KS-8, who asserted that “if you get education … then you [can] get a 
job,” later qualified his statement:  
 
‘Most of the time it’s all about people getting in a job when they know 
somebody.  Because most of the time you just find people—they apply 
for a job, but they don’t get the job and then you get people who have got 
the job, but they [are] not qualified to have the job.’ 
 
Those from disadvantaged backgrounds who have experienced little mobility 
ultimately blame their lack of progress on this cronyism and nepotism.  KU-3, 
the unemployed wife of the taxi driver, describes how jobs are distributed in her 
neighborhood: “If I get a tender then I call all my cousins in the Eastern Cape 
[and] I forget about those who are already here and so it sort of becomes a 
family thing.”  Thus, KU-3 argues that the possibility that she will experience 
upward mobility is “zilch!  Zero-point-zero … [because] the people who are 
there, they’ve got their own brothers and sisters that if there is anything that is 
coming—it can be anything—they are calling their brothers and sister now.  
And [then] we don’t have money.”  Similarly, KU-6, the gardener, sees little 
hope of a better future:  
 
‘There is no one in here—where I stay—who [will] come from 
there and take me to work.  [Instead,] they bring his cousin in 
Eastern Cape to start on the job the following day.  But I am living 
with her here and she knows that I am not working, but he can’t 
take me to that job…She take her cousin from Eastern Cape. That’s 
why it’s so difficult, because if somebody knows [that] [KU-6] 
doesn’t work, why don’t you take [KU-6] to that job? You prefer 










The importance of social capital, or informal networks and connections, for 
securing employment in South Africa is well documented (see Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2006: 280-7). As early as 1984, McCartan, through a series of 
interviews with 43 employers in the Eastern Cape, observed that informal 
networks played a large role in the hiring processes of both skilled and semi-
skilling workers.  Similarly, Standing, Sender and Weeks (1996: 338), in their 
analysis of survey responses of 500 manufacturers in Cape Town, Durban, 
Gauteng and Port Elizabeth, found that 41.4 percent of manufacturers utilised 
family and friend networks to fill their vacancies, while only 7.3 percent 
considered applicants with no prior relation to the firm.   And it appears that 
those looking for work have adjusted their approach accordingly: Erasmus 
(1999: 60), in his survey of 2,000 unemployed individuals, concluded that most 
black South Africans “relied [mainly] on family and friends” to seek and secure 
employment.  
 
The role of informal networks in securing employment appears particularly 
important in Cape Town. In their analysis of Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain 
Survey responses, Seekings and Nattrass (2006: 284-6; see also Schöer and 
Leibbrandt, 2006) found that nearly two-thirds of respondents reported that their 
first job came through help from either friends or family, and nearly 60 percent 
of respondents reported that they got their “previous” job through these social 
networks.  Perhaps more interestingly, 91 percent of respondents either agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement “Employers employ the friends and 
relatives of their existing workforce rather than other people.”  Furthermore, 
Magruder (2007: 18-21, 28-9), in his analysis of familial network effects among 
respondents of the Cape Area Panel Survey, found that a father’s employment 
status had a “substantial” impact on his son’s employment status, indicating the 
importance of familial connections in securing work. 
 
Wittenberg (2002: 1193-4) offers one possible explanation for why social 
networks are so crucial to gaining employment in South Africa.  “In a situation 
in which potential employers become swamped with applicants” with identical 
qualifications, as in South Africa, Wittenberg argues, “virtually any formal 
method of screening applicants becomes problematic.”  In such situations, he 
continues, “not many employers would be willing to bear the[] kinds of costs 
[necessary] to ensure that insider networks do not determine the job allocation 
process.”  And this explanation gives some indication of how the seemingly 
contradictory views held by those in categories 2 and 4 - that individual merit, 
hard work, and educational attainment can yield success but social networks are 








for securing unskilled employment because of the surfeit of identically qualified 
applicants. However, because of South Africa’s extremely large skills mismatch 
(see, Banerjee et al., 2008), if an individual is able to distinguish himself 
through hard work or education and progress past the bottom occupational rungs, 





Summary Table 4: Nepotism, social capital and government connections 
 














Those from category 1 ultimately felt 
that their lack of social capital greatly 
circumscribed their opportunities for 
climbing the social ladder.  This view 
largely reflects reality in South Africa: 
unskilled positions tend to be allotted 
through social networks. 
Individuals in category 2, despite 
emphasising the potential for hard 
work and education to yield success, 
argued that the probability of further 
mobility was undermined by 
nepotism, connections to 
government contractors and a lack 













 Although those from category 4 
recognised the potential for social 
networks and government 
connections to facilitate upward 
mobility, respondents still saw 
abundant opportunities for 
meritocratic advancement and 
commended affirmative action 











Expectations of Intra- and Intergenerational Social 
Mobility in Cape Town 
 
Expectations of intra-generational mobility largely reflect previous mobility 
experience and the perceived accessibility of the key mobility pathways 
identified during the interviews.  Perhaps more surprisingly, expectations of 
intergenerational mobility - perceptions of whether the next generation will be 
more successful than the previous one - were also largely related to previous 
mobility experiences.  This section further examines these patterns and 
identifies the possibility of a “mobility trap” developing in Cape Town. 
 
All of those in category 4, or those from advantaged backgrounds with 
successful outcomes, believed that they could reach “the top” if they desired.  
UCT-4 described how her “stubborn[ess]” and “education” “differentiates [her] 
from everyone else at the bottom.”  Similarly, although UCT-3 indicated that 
her likelihood of getting to “the top” was increased because she “come[s] from a 
rich family,” she also highlighted her educational background and hard work: “I 
think the mere fact that I’m at UCT—I got there by my own marks, I’ve kept 
myself by my own merits—I think that in itself speaks volumes for me” and her 
potential.   
 
Interestingly, most of those in category 4 conceptualised their mobility as a 
distinctly intergenerational process.  Despite couching social mobility in 
“individualistic” terms, stressing the importance of hard work and capitalising 
on opportunity, they recognised that their successes are ultimately the product 
of their parents’ and grandparents’ successes and values.  As UCT-1 described,  
 
‘Both of my [grand]parents were domestic workers.  So, both of my 
parents were able to jump onto the middle class, and through their 
endeavors to make life better for the family we’ve been able to get 
between the middle and the top classes. … There’s definitely been a shift 
in where we fall within South African society and I’d like to make that go 















Furthermore, all of those in category 4 believed that this intergenerational  
upward trend would continue.  As UCT-4 related,  
 
‘As a parent, you strive to give your kids what you didn’t get.  So 
my mom didn’t get a chance to go to UCT and I’m getting that.  I 
think, my kids should go to Harvard. … [My children] will have 
more access to the things that I didn’t have when I was growing up, 
but I’ll still have the same principles that my mom gave me, like 
“education is important” and “these are your options.” … So, I think 
they have [an even] greater chance of being at the top.’ 
 
Similarly, those from disadvantaged backgrounds who had already experienced 
some upward mobility, e.g. those in category 2, saw significant opportunity for 
continued upward mobility for both themselves and their children.  KS-1 
described, “At my position at Metrorail as a protection officer, I know that if I 
work hard, then there is a chance that I will get the opportunity to get something 
more … I can work hard to be something else in that company.”  But she also 
conceded that her mobility was ultimately limited: she admitted that she might 
not reach all her goals because “I only finished matric.  I couldn’t afford to go to 
university or college or whatever.”  Yet, even if her own mobility were limited, 
she believed that her success would ensure that her children’s mobility would 
not be: “My children will afford [education], because I will save for them to go 
there” and then they will be “able to afford what they want.”   
 
KS-2 expressed nearly identical sentiments: although “there is a chance for” her 
to reach the top, “because I think I have study, it’s just that I need experience.  
If I could get experience, I will get a good job” “that will [take] me higher,” her 
success was still reliant on a degree “luck.”  But even if her mobility faltered, 
her kids’ success would not, 
 
‘…because I will make sure that my kids are studying very hard to get [] 
the right jobs and even if they don’t study I will make sure that they have 
their own businesses.  I will push them … You see now, it’s easier for 
us—the new generation—to make things happen than before … Because 
now we have the knowledge now to do some things … [that] our parents’ 
[didn’t]. 
 
Those in category 1, however, were significantly less optimistic about their 
prospects for upward mobility.  KU-3, for example, asserted that the chances 








Similarly, KU-4 conceded that despite his efforts, there is “not a good 
likelihood” that he will get to the top.  And KU-5, although he felt that “I still 
have some chances [of leaving poverty], if I can get a proper job,” thought the 
chances of him getting a “proper job” were extremely low “because I am 
uneducated.  Because in most places they are looking for educated people.”   
 
Not only did those in category 1 express pessimism about their prospects for 
upward mobility, but they also have substantially lower ambitions than those in 
categories 2 and 4.  KU-6 asserted, “I don’t want some money to be rich, no!  I 
just want money to afford—not just taxis, no, just money to afford.  I can use 
the train.”  Similarly, KU-4 described, “I mean even for me I don’t want to be 
up there.  I don’t want to rule or something.  I just want to attain a better living.”  
These views suggest that those from disadvantaged backgrounds who have 
experienced little social mobility have largely accepted their circumstances: 
their hope of upward mobility is so distant that their aspirations have adjusted 
accordingly. 
 
Perhaps more interestingly, those in category 1 were equally pessimistic about 
their children’s prospects of mobility.  As KU-3 indicated, her children have 
little prospect of mobility, even if her economic position improves somewhat: 
“I’m doing everything, creating my own family.  So now, if my child would be 
poor, I’m the foundation.  She will be poor because I am poor.  If I am average 
she will be average because I’m average.” “I think it starts with the parents, 
truly,” she continued.  Although KU-5 was slightly less pessimistic than KU-3 - 
or example, he felt that “if I have a proper job and I am a permanent worker and 
I get paid well, then I can educate my children” and they can become successful 
- he too argued, “If I do not work then the child will not have [the] chances” of 
moving up.  These views point to the existence of a perceived intergenerational 
“mobility trap” in Cape Town.  And this mobility trap may, in fact, be self 
fulfilling: if parents feel that there is little hope that their children’s socio-
economic status will differ from their own, then they may be less inclined to 
invest significant resources in their children’s future, thereby making these 
perceptions reality. 
 
Overall, perceptions of social mobility in Cape Town were largely dependent on 
previous mobility experiences and the perceived accessibility of a number of 
key mobility pathways, primarily education.  This section demonstrated the 
large gulf between those who have experienced any mobility and those who 








their lifetimes believed that either they or their children could reach “the top,” 
those who have not did could not fully imagine breaking the cycle. 
 

















d Not only were those from category 1 
pessimistic about their chances for 
upward mobility, but they also have 
substantially lower ambitions than 
those in categories 2 and 4.  Perhaps 
more importantly, those in category 1 
were equally pessimistic about their 
children’s prospects of mobility, 
which points to the development of an 
intergenerational “mobility trap” in 
Cape Town. 
Those from category 2 saw 
significant opportunity for continued 
upward mobility for themselves.  
Even if they believed that their own 
mobility was ultimately limited, 
however, respondents from category 
2 were optimistic that their success 
would guarantee the upward mobility 












d  All of those in category 4 believed 
that they could reach “the top” if they 
desired.  Recognising that their 
successes were ultimately the product 
of their parents’ and grandparents’ 
successes, those from category 4 were 
hopeful that their children would 






The purpose of this study was to probe perceptions of social mobility in one part 
of South Africa. Although the existing literature on social mobility is limited, 
investigating social mobility is enormously important for understanding the 
nature of South African inequality, evaluating the robustness of South Africa’s 
democracy and gauging the efficacy of many post-apartheid policies.  
Perceptions of social mobility among South Africans may ultimately have a 
more direct impact on South Africa’s economic and political systems than 








focused.  This paper thus attempted to augment the existing literature on 
perceptions of social mobility in South Africa by investigating subjective 
mobility among black individuals in a single South African city, Cape Town, 
through twelve in-depth ethnographic interviews. 
 
This paper differed from prior research on perceptions of social mobility by 
focusing on interviewees’ mobility experience, as opposed to economic position.  
To accomplish this goal, the population was divided into four categories based 
on background and outcome.  This study focused on perceptions of social 
mobility among three of these groups: those from disadvantaged backgrounds 
who have had relatively unsuccessful outcomes, or those in category 1; those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds who have had relatively successful outcomes, 
or those in category 2; and those from advantaged backgrounds who remain in 
their advantaged positions, or those in category 4.  Because there is little 
significant downward mobility for those already near the top of the income 
distribution, the third category - those from advantaged backgrounds who have 
had relatively unsuccessful outcomes - is less salient to this study. 
 
All interviewees stressed the strong relationship between race and class in South 
Africa.  Most believed that the top of the income distribution is predominantly 
white and the bottom is entirely black.  These views are consistent with the 
reality in Cape Town but increasingly inconsistent with the national reality. 
They suggest that the rapid deracialisation of South Africa’s class structures that 
began near the end of apartheid is largely unrecognised by many black 
individuals living in Cape Town.   Although South Africa still has a long way to 
go before the systemic economic disadvantages of over 40 years of apartheid 
policies are fully redressed, this finding suggests that if South Africa’s leaders 
continue to stress the lack of economic progress for black South Africans, these 
views of the racialised stratification of income will be reinforced and social 
cohesion in South Africa could be negatively impacted. 
 
Despite the widespread belief that the top of the income distribution was mostly 
white, all of the interviewees identified a number of pathways to upward 
mobility.  Not all of the respondents, however, agreed on the accessibility of 
these pathways.  Those in categories 2 and 4 tended to conceptualise mobility in 
individualistic terms; they believed that upward mobility was available to those 
willing to work hard and motivated to take advantage of the educational 
opportunities available to all South Africans.  Those who have not taken 
advantage of these opportunities were thus viewed as “lazy,” and South Africa’s 








In contrast, those who had experienced little mobility and remained 
disadvantaged - those in category 1 - recognised the importance of hard work 
and education for economic success, but tended to offer structural explanations 
for their lack of mobility and faulted their lack of social capital and the rampant 
nepotism in Cape Town for exhausting the few opportunities available to them.  
Ultimately, those in categories 2 and 4 were optimistic about the potential for 
continued upward mobility for themselves and their children, while those in 
category 1 expressed little hope of a better future, either for their generation or 
the next.  The views articulated by those in category 1 indicate the troubling 
possibility of the development of a “mobility trap” in Cape Town, especially if 
perceptions of immobility further inhibit their poor prospects for actual mobility. 
 
These two antithetical conceptualisations of the process of social mobility in 
Cape Town - the primarily individualistic understanding of mobility held by 
those in categories 2 and 4 and the structural understanding espoused by those 
in category 1 - may make it more difficult for South Africa to engage in serious 
structural reforms.  Because these findings indicate that a significant portion of 
Cape Town’s black population may believe that the playing field has already 
been leveled, that any individual can be successful through hard work, there 
may be little will or even incentive among the Cape Townian, and potentially 
South African, political and economic leadership to seriously address the deep 
structural legacies of apartheid.  These contrasting views about the nature of 
economic opportunity in Cape Town could adversely affect the cohesiveness of 
post-apartheid South Africa, especially if those in category 1 continue to feel 
alienated by the existing economic system. 
 
Furthermore, although equal numbers of individuals were interviewed in each 
category, all of these mobility experiences are not equally represented in society.  
The official unemployment rate in South Africa is around 25 percent, and the 
unofficial rate, which includes those who have given up looking for work, is 
above 35 percent of the population (Statistics South Africa).  Moreover, as 
Johnson (2009: 61) observes, the employment rate “counts people as employed 
if they have but a single hour’s paid work (say, washing and polishing a car) in 
a week,” a category of individuals that this study labeled the “underemployed.”  
These figures indicate that the first category - those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds who have experienced little upward mobility (who remain 
unemployed or underemployed) - is substantially larger than each of the other 
categories.  Thus, although those in categories 2 and 4 were quite optimistic 
about their future mobility prospects, these preliminary results suggest that there 








mobility and are discontented with the current structure of the South African 
economy.  The disproportionate size of category 1 indicates the possible extent 
of the mobility trap identified in this study and that a large portion of the Cape 
Townian, and potentially South African, population is at great risk of being left 
out of future economic gains. 
 
The unique focus of this study on mobility experience as opposed to relative 
class position makes it difficult to compare its findings to the international 
literature, but perhaps unsurprisingly, it appears that South Africa’s deeply 
racialised history may impact perceptions of social mobility among black 
residents of Cape Town, and possibly South Africa more generally, in 
distinctive ways.  The end of apartheid and the advent of democracy removed 
the single largest barrier to economic opportunities for black South Africans: 
their race.  Thus, there appears to be greater expectations of intergenerational 
mobility and greater optimism among black Cape Townians in post-apartheid 
South Africa than in more economically advanced countries, where hope of 
mobility is much lower (see, Heath, Graaf and Yaojun, 2010).  Furthermore, 
because all black South Africans were economically disadvantaged under 
apartheid, the relative socioeconomic position of black Cape Town residents 
does not seem to impact perceptions of mobility in similar ways that it does in 
other areas of the world (see, Graham, 2000; Webb, 2000). 
 
These findings in Cape Town, however, probably cannot be generalised to the 
rest of South Africa.  Cape Town’s social structure is atypical for South Africa 
(Seekings, 2007: 5-6).  Although a majority of South African citizens are black, 
up until the 1970s Cape Town was 90 percent white and colored.  Even today, 
after massive immigration from the Eastern Cape, black people comprise a 
minority of the city’s population.  Because of this distinct history, “Cape Town 
has a distinctive cultural character” (ibid: 5), which undoubtedly influenced this 
study’s findings.  Furthermore, Cape Town is not economically representative 
of South Africa either.  Cape Town has much larger upper and intermediate 
classes.  The poor of Cape Town are well-off relative to the poor in rural areas.  
And in Cape Town, race still largely overlaps with class, making “it difficult 
often to distinguish between the effects of race and class” (ibid: 6). 
 
Moreover, the results of this study are based entirely on interviews with black 
individuals.  Although probing black perceptions of social mobility is 
particularly important because black individuals constitute the vast majority of 
South Africa’s population and were the group most disadvantaged by apartheid 








coloured or white South Africans, who comprise minority racial groups 
nationally, but together comprise a majority of Cape Town’s population.  The 
age cohort interviewed also limits the significance of these findings: as Graham 
(2000: 243-4) observed during her study of perceptions of social mobility in 
Latin America, “Younger generations tended to be … more optimistic about the 
future [and their children’s future] than older ones,” perhaps reflective of the 
disproportionate educational and economic opportunities available to younger 
cohorts in increasingly globalised markets.  Furthermore, Bray et al.’s (2010: 
217-9) findings on perceptions of educational attainment in Cape Town may 
indicate that as individuals grow older, they may grow less optimistic about 
their future prospects for upward mobility.  Finally, this study’s findings were 
ultimately based on a relatively small number of interviewees that lacks any 
statistical significance.  Thus, although the views expressed during the 
interviews may be somewhat representative of the particular cohort analysed -  
black Cape Town residents between ages 20 and 30 - they are not necessarily 
representative of black Cape Town residents more generally, let alone the rest of 
the South African population. 
 
The limited generalisability of these results suggests that this study should only 
be a starting point for further inquiry.  Researchers interested in perceptions of 
social mobility in South Africa should consider analysing how these perceptions 
differ among various age cohorts; how location affects conceptualisations of 
social mobility, in particular whether rural South Africans (who comprise nearly 
half of the country’s population) have a similar understanding of their mobility; 
whether residents of areas more “typical” of the social and cultural character of 
South Africa than Cape Town have different views of their economic 
opportunities; and whether different subgroups of South African society have 
similar aspirations and expectations about their futures.  Additionally, future 
research should consider utilising broader-based and more statistically robust, 
but perhaps less nuanced, methods such as survey instruments, in order to 
complement a series of in-depth, open-ended interviews. Ultimately, this study, 
in addition to offering initial findings on perceptions of social mobility among 
black South Africans in Cape Town, more importantly suggests a potentially 
fruitful and vital path that scholars of social mobility can pursue elsewhere in 








Appendix A:  





3. How do you support yourself? 
4. In order to gauge material goods that people have:  
a. Do you have a TV? (If so, what kind: widescreen vs. older model) 
b. Do you have a cell phone? (If so, a smartphone?) 
c. How do you listen to music? 
d. Do you have a car? (If so, what kind?) 
5. Number of dependents (Try to parse out whether he/she is supporting 
people in other parts of country): 
a. Do you send money to family members who do not live nearby?  
b. Who are these family members? How much money do you send 
them per month? 
6. Where do you live? 
 
Interview Questions: 
1. These four pictures show different types of society. The first picture 
represents a society with a small elite of rich people at the top, a few 
people in the middle, and a large number of poor people at the bottom.  
The second picture represents a society that is like a pyramid, with a 
small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and a lot of poor people 
at the bottom.  The third picture shows a society in which most people are 
in the middle.  The fourth picture shows a society with lots of people at 
the top, some in the middle, and very few at the bottom.   
a. Which of these pictures, in your view, describes South Africa 
today? 
b. Where would you situate yourself in that picture? 
c. Is this the same way society looked 10 years ago? What about 20 
years ago? 
d. In your understanding of the economic makeup of society, where 
would you place most of the white people?  Where would you 
place most of the black individuals? If you remove all the black 
people, what picture would you say best describes white society?  
What about black society? 
e. How do you think society should look?  Where would you like to 








f. What are the chances that you’ll reach the top? What about your 
children? What are the chances you’ll be in the bottom? What 
about the middle? 
 
2. Personal financial situation 
a. Is your overall financial situation today better, the same or worse 
than it was five years ago?  
b. Why has it gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse over the 
last five years? 
 
3. Differences between rich and poor 
a. How large do you think the differences between rich and poor are? 
b. Have these differences gotten bigger or smaller in the last 5/10/15 
years? 
 
4. Future predictions 
a. Do you think that the number of poor people in South Africa in 
five years time is going to be larger, the same or smaller than it is 
now?   
b. What about the number of rich people?  
c.  The number of middle class? 
 
5. Material possessions 
a. What material possessions do you think defines someone as rich in 
South Africa?   
b. What about poor?   
c. What about middle class? 
 
6. Government intervention 
a. Do you think that the government is doing too much, enough, or 
too little for poor people in South Africa?   
b. Do you think they’re doing too much, enough, or too little for rich 
people in South Africa?  
c. What do you think the government should do differently for the 
poor?  












7. Economic status of South Africa’s black Africans 
a. Do you feel that the number of black middle class and rich people 
has increased, decreased, or remained the same in the last 10 years?   
b. How do black people become middle class or rich? 
c. Why are some people rich and others poor?   
d. How does one become richer? 
 
8. Hypothetical questions 
a. What kind of car would you like to buy if money were no limit?  
i. Why do you want that car?  
ii. How will people respond if you drive around with that car? 
b. If I give you R5000 tomorrow what would you spend it on? If you 
had to give it away, to whom would you give it? 
 
9. Additional questions 
a. For UCT students: What would your family think if you came 
home with a white girlfriend or boyfriend?  Is this different from 
how other people in your neighborhood would react? 
b. For those in categories 1 and 2: When you were younger, what did 
you want to be when you grew up and why?  Why have you (not) 
achieved these ambitions?  What are your aspirations now?  What 
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